Military Threats: The Costs of Coercion and the Price of Peace
Lieferbar innert 2 Wochen
BeschreibungThis book asks whether military power is central in determining which states get their voice heard, and if so, how and why.
InhaltsverzeichnisPart I. Coercion and Credibility: 1. Introduction; 2. Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining; Part II. A Theory of Military Threats: 3. A model of military threats; 4. Comparing the instruments of coercion; Part III. Elements of Militarized Deterrence: 5. Militarization and the distribution of power and interests; 6. The expansion of the Korean War, 1950; 7. The price of peace and military threat effectiveness; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Implications; Appendix A. Formalities for Chapter 2; Appendix B. Formalities for Chapter 3; Appendix C. Formalities for Chapter 4; Appendix D. Formalities for Chapter 5.
PortraitBranislav L. Slantchev is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He specialises in the use of game theory to study international conflict, negotiations, and the political economy of war finance.
Pressestimmen'This book is an impressive display of intellectual firepower. It will be required reading for anyone interested in crisis bargaining or deterrence.' R. Harrison Wagner, University of Texas, Austin 'Military Threats offers the most comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of crisis bargaining and escalation I know. Full of new insights and intuitions, this book defines the cutting edge of research in one of the most important areas of formal work on war, that of endogenizing the distribution of power.' Robert Powell, Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley
Untertitel: New. Sprache: Englisch.
Verlag: CAMBRIDGE UNIV PR
Erscheinungsdatum: Februar 2011
Seitenanzahl: 328 Seiten